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Abstract—Some online social networks (OSNs) allow users
to define friendship-groups as reusable shortcuts for sharing
information with multiple contacts. Posting exclusively to a
friendship-group gives some privacy control, while supporting
communication with (and within) this group. However, recipients
of such posts may want to reuse content for their own social
advantage, and can bypass existing controls by copy-pasting into
a new post; this cross-posting poses privacy risks.
This paper presents a learning to share approach that enables
the incorporation of more nuanced privacy controls into OSNs.
Specifically, we propose a reusable, adaptive software architecture
that uses rigorous runtime analysis to help OSN users to make
informed decisions about suitable audiences for their posts. This
is achieved by supporting dynamic formation of recipient-groups
that benefit social interactions while reducing privacy risks. We
exemplify the use of our approach in the context of Facebook.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online Social networks (OSNs) are increasingly used to
maintain social ties with family members, friends, and col-
leagues, and build new social relationships (e.g., [1]–[3]).
However, these benefits come with an increased risk of privacy
violation from oversharing or underusing privacy controls [4]–
[8]. Many OSN platforms currently support privacy manage-
ment through features such as static (user-defined) friendship
groups as reusable shortcuts for sharing a single post with
multiple contacts. Users can select the group they deem
most appropriate when posting a message. In OSNs such as
Facebook, LinkedIn and Google+, users may perceive posting
in closed group as a quick fix to their privacy concerns, since
these OSNs can constrain the re-sharing to only those contacts
who have received the original message. However, these
privacy control mechanisms do not account for cross-posting,
i.e. when a contact copy-and-pastes the original message into
a new post, and sends it to contacts outside the original group,
to either improve their own social capital or damage that of
the original user [9]. We argue that privacy in OSNs cannot
be effectively delivered by inflexible and rarely-visited privacy
settings, instead contact lists should be formed dynamically per
post, such that unwanted cross-posting is minimized while the
user’s social benefit is optimised.
In this paper, we propose an adaptive privacy control
approach, called learning to share, that enables software
engineers/developers to incorporate adaptive privacy decision
support into OSN applications. Specifically, we propose a
software architecture that supports continuous monitoring of
online interactions between each user-contact pair in a user’s
social network, to predict three categories of contacts: those
who are most likely to pose a privacy breach (i.e. risky
friends); those who are socially inactive but privacy aware
(i.e., safe friends); and those who are both socially active
and privacy aware (i.e., super friends). The prediction is
based on an interaction model of sharing behaviours, which is
updated on-line in response to monitored behaviour and used
to evaluate social benefit and privacy risk of sharing a post with
each potential recipient. The outcome of the classification is
used by the decision support component of the architecture to
dynamically form contacts lists per post, and allows the user
to efficiently select the recipient group on a per post basis.
The underlying OSN infrastructure can take into account the
informed selection by the user and dynamically control who
should be receiving which message when delivering the post.
Our proposed software architecture is not specific to a
particular OSN environment. Software engineers working on
developing and/or improving existing OSN applications with
adaptive privacy decision mechanisms, can use our proposed
architecture by deploying its automated learning and decision
support capabilities, and integrating an Abstract Interaction
Model and a wrapper for monitoring the type of social
interactions that are specific to the particular OSN application.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents a motivating example within the context of Facebook.
Section III describes our Learning to Share architecture.
Section IV exemplifies how OSN behaviours can be modelled
as parametric Markov model, using the example of Facebook;
introduces the related component for monitoring social net-
work activities, and presents the online learning algorithm
used to predict the model’s parameters. Section V describes
the computation of social benefit and privacy risk used by the
decision support component. Section VI discusses related work
and concludes the paper with a summary and future work.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Here, we illustrate the need for adaptive privacy control with
a motivating example based on Facebook use. Facebook user
Bob shares sensitive post A with his predefined close friends
group, which does not include Ann – Bob’s work colleague but
not a close friend. As Ann is not a member of the close friends
group, Facebook does not allow her to see Bob’s post, and
members of close friends are unable to re-share the post with
her. Tom, a member of Bob’s close friends group, is also a
close friend of Ann, but is unaware of this privacy aspect of
Facebook’s group sharing. When Tom receives the post A, he
naively decides to copy and paste the content into a new post,
B, adding some content of his own, and shares B with a group
of contacts which includes Ann. Now Ann can see, via cross-
posting, what Bob shared in post A, but Facebook is unable
to detect this or notify Bob that his on-line close friend Tom
has violated his privacy, albeit unintentionally.
Bob’s Social Network
Bob
Close Friends List
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share post A
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Tom Sue EveBenJoe
Fig. 1: A scenario of privacy breach.
This shows that, while customised social network groups are
convenient for posting to multiple recipients and (in Facebook
at least) offering a form of privacy control, this static feature
can easily be bypassed, even fairly innocently. Good adaptive
privacy control would, instead, monitor Tom’s actions, detect
the similarity between posts A and B, and use this information
to learn that sending sensitive posts to Tom represents a
privacy risk, presenting this information to Bob the next time
he intends to share another sensitive post with close friends.
III. PRIVACY AWARE SHARING ARCHITECTURE
Our proposed learning to share approach is implemented as
a reusable, adaptive software architecture as shown in Figure 2.
The architecture comprises two main modules: i) modelling
and monitoring (marked C2), and ii) adaptive decision support
(marked C3). This design enables software engineers working
on OSN applications to deploy our architecture by reusing
the automated learning and decision support capabilities and
developing just two components: the abstract interaction model
for the specific OSN application and a wrapper, which enables
monitoring of the application specific social network interac-
tions, and execution of sharing decisions.
The OSN wrapper implements the monitor functionality to
detect for each recipient of each post subsequent interactions
between user and recipient, e.g., resulting likes and comments
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Fig. 2: Learning to share Architecture
on Facebook. Monitored events are used by the Learning En-
gine component, which updates the parameters of the associ-
ated instantiated interaction model, called Concrete Interaction
Models, essentially capturing the probability of each possible
social interaction at each post’s sensitivity level. The concrete
interaction model is then queried by the Decision Support
System (DSS) to assess sharing decisions. Specifically, the
DSS employs the concrete interaction model, a risk averseness
threshold and a post’s sensitivity level to evaluate the re-share
risk and social benefit and to classify (at run-time) each of
user’s contacts as super, safe or risky. Sensitivity levels of
shared posts are defined by the user and stored, together with
the post, to check for future re-shares of the post.
By providing just the wrapper and an abstract interaction
model, learning to share can be deployed for different OSNs
either as a fully integrated feature of an OSN’s infrastructure
(i.e. total view mode), or as a plugin application of an
existing OSN infrastructure (i.e. partial view mode). In the
first case, the adaptive privacy control benefits from full access
to the OSN’s global network community and the monitoring
of online social behaviour of all members in the network.
Whereas, partial view mode only provides adaptive privacy
control and monitoring of users of the plugin application.
IV. MODELLING AND MONITORING RUNTIME ACTIVITY
This section describes the modelling module of our archi-
tecture as a parametric Markov model, illustrating it with an
example of an abstract interaction model for Facebook. It also
presents our online learning method for updating the model’s
parameters and a method for monitoring social interaction
events, used for computing the updates.
A. Quantitative Verification of Markov Chains
Online social interactions can be modelled using parametric
Markov chains (PMC). These are defined as follows:
Definition 4.1: A reward-annotated finite state discrete-
time parametric Markov chain (PMC), M, is the tuple
< S, s0,V,P, ι, L >, with S a finite set of states and initial
state s0 ∈ S; V a set of real-valued parameters; P a parametric
transition probability |S| × |S|-matrix whose elements are
functions of V; the reward function ι : S → R≥0 assigning
a non-negative reward for each state, and labelling function
L : S → 2AP assigning a set of atomic propositions to
each state. The (i, j)th element of P, pij , is a function of
parameters V (written pij ∈ FV ) and represents the probability
of transitioning from si to sj . pij takes values strictly in [0, 1]
and
∑
j pij = 1 for all i.
Probabilistic model checker PRISM1 [12] allows PMCs
to be expressed in a high-level language, and efficiently
evaluates queries expressed in a reward-augmented version
of probabilistic computational tree logic (PCTL) [13]. We
use PRISM’s reward query operator R=?[Φ] in conjunction
with the reachability reward property Φ = [F a], to evalute
the average reward accumulated along a path until a state
satisfying proposition a ∈ AP is reached (for PCTL semantics
see [14]). When queried with a PMC, PRISM’s reward query
operator produces a symbolic expression, V ∈ FV , of the
associated reward property (a function of V). In what follows
we describe how we use this functionality to predict expected
social benefit and privacy risk in the context of Facebook.
B. Modelling Sharing Behaviours
We describe here our PMC model for Facebook. It captures
the online social interactions between a user and contact, c,
following the user’s post. The first model, M1c (see Fig. 3)
captures comments and likes from both contact c and the
user following some post. This behaviour is assumed to be
independent of a post’s sensitivity (as discussed later). States
in M1c are: s1, s2, s3 and s4 respectively representing likes
by c and user, and comments by c and user; initial state s0;
terminal state send; and s6 (which simply improves readabil-
ity). Symbolic parameters inM1c are p1, p2, p3, p4 ∈ [0, 1] and
r1, r2, r3, r4 > 0. Associated transition probabilities, rewards
and propositional labels are shown in the figure. For example,
if M1c is in state s0, then p1 is the probability that the next
reaction is a like by c, and given any of the four reactions, the
system returns to s0 with certainty.
There are 5 remaining models, M2c,l (see Fig. 4), one per
sensitivity level l ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, which capture the reshare
behaviour of the contact in response to a post at sensitivity l.
States in M2c,l are: initial state s0; terminal state send; and s5
representing a reshare by c.M2c,l has two symbolic parameters
ql ∈ [0, 1] and r5 ≥ 0. Again, transition probabilities, rewards
and labels are shown in the figure. In an example execution
of M2c,l from state s0, ql is the probability that a c reshares,
and this can happen at most once.
We wish to estimate the social benefit of all reactions which
follow the user sharing a post at sensitivity l with c, and equate
this with the total reward accumluated over the lifetime of the
parallel execution of M1c and M2c,l. This corresponds to the
sum of the expressions returned by PRISM when R=?[Fend]
1Similar model checkers include MRMC [10] and Ymer [11].
is invoked on each model. These queries can be invoked once
at design time and respectively give:
V 1c =
∑4
i=1 piri
(1−∑4i=1 pi) (1)
V 2c,l = qlr5 (2)
We discuss the use of these expressions in Section V-A.
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Fig. 3: PMC model of online social interactions between a Facebook
user and their post recipient c.
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Fig. 4: PMC model capturing the re-sharing behaviour of a recipient
c for posts received with sensitivity level l.
C. Online Learning of Sharing Behaviour
PMC modelling and analysis, like that described above, is
conventionally used for offline analysis of system properties
[15], [16]. We instead apply these techniques at runtime
updating our PMC parameters in light of observed interac-
tions. We must, however, consider two complicating factors.
First, c’s behaviour may change with time, and so we use a
variant of the adaptive Bayesian learning algorithm from [17].
Secondly, we can never observe when the user-contact pair
stop interacting on a given post. To address this, we account
for unobserved transitions to terminal states, send, by noting
that each execution must eventually make this transition, and
constructing a synthetic observation to the end state for every
shared post with the same time-stamp as the original share.
Here, we describe how transition probabilities pij of a PMC
can be learned when the analysed system is operational, and
its state transitions monitored (for Facebook these correspond
to the monitored events, such as comments, likes, share and re-
share). More formally, suppose that, we have observed K > 0
transitions out of si ∈ S and that the k-th such transition
1 ≤ k ≤ K, is to state sjk ∈ S, we define
σkij =
{
1 if jk = j
0 otherwise
(3)
and estimate probability of a state transition from si to sj as
pKij =
coi
coi +K
poij +
K
coi +K
fKij
gKij
(4)
where p0ij is the prior for p
K
ij , c
0
i > 0 quantifies our confidence,
f1ij = σ
1
ij , g
1
ij = 1, and for K > 1, f
K
ij and g
K
ij are defined
recursively as:
fKij = α
−(tK−tK−1)fK−1ij + σ
K
ij
gKij = α
−(tK−tK−1)gK−1ij + 1
Here, tK represents the timestamp of the K-th observation,
and α ≥ 1 is an ageing parameter (see [17] for a full
description and proof). These probability estimates have two
key features: older observations are downweighted, allowing
rapid adaptation to changes in pij ; and the recursive form
means storage and computation complexity are both in O(1).
D. Interaction Monitoring
The Monitor component detects events that are being
tracked by our behavioural models (see Section IV-B), and,
when detected, notifies the Learning Engine so that appropriate
updates can be invoked (see Section IV-C). In order to detect
cross-posting based on a post’s modality (e.g., text, image,
audio or video), in the Monitor component, state-of-the-art
information retrieval techniques [18] can be implemented
as a pluggable module to measure the similarity between
posts sent to c, and posts c subsequently shares with others.
Posts that exceed some similarity threshold (e.g., [19]) can
be treated as cross-posts and the Learning Engine notified.
Such a task is becoming feasible recently with the advance
of high performance hardware and also information retrieval
techniques [19]–[25].
V. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM
In this section, we present the technical details of our
decison support system (DSS) that elicits and models the
sharing preferences of the user, and informs the user of
any sharing decisions that represent significant benefits or
exceed certain risk thresholds derived from these preferences.
Section V-A and Section V-B formally define the social benefit
and privacy risk models, and Section V-C describes how we
initialise the parameters associated with these models. Finally,
in Section V-D we discuss the mechanisms for the user to
adjust the parameters of the privacy risk model, based on
continual feedback about the working system from the user.
A. Social Benefit
The DSS estimates the social-benefit a user expects to gain
when sharing a post with contact, c, from the Concrete Inter-
action Models, described in Section IV-B. For our Facebook
example, this is captured by modelsM1c andM2c,l. These two
models attribute socially-beneficial rewards to relevant social
events: reshares (of non-sensitive posts), comments and likes
by contact c; and comments and likes in response by the user.
A user may value each event differently, but for simplicity
we assign a fixed value to each event type. As discussed in
Section IV, the expected social-benefit for sharing a post with
at sensitivity l with contact c, is the expected total reward
accumulated over the lifetime of the parallel computation of
models M1c and M2c,l, and is given by
Bc,l = V
1
c + V
2
c,l =
∑4
i=1 piri
(1−∑4i=1 pi) + qlr5 (5)
For each potential sharing decision, the expected social benefit,
Bc,l, is compared with a threshold, B¯, set for the user.
If it exceeds that threshold, Bc,l > B¯, then the user is
notified by placing contact c in the super friends list. If a
different behavioural model were implemented, then the above
expression would need to be updated appropriately.
While a variety of choices could be made about rewards
in our Facebook model, we suggest the following simple,
intuitive choice. Without loss of generality, a contact’s com-
ment is given a unitary reward, i.e. r3 = 1. Other rewards
r1 =
1
2 , r2 =
1
4 , r4 =
1
2 and r5 = 1 are based on a small
study where participants were given a questionnaire2 about
expected levels of interaction following a Facebook post.
B. Privacy Risk
The DSS also estimates privacy risk – a numerical value of
undesirability related to risky decisions. By definition, sharing
any post at sensitivity l = 0 carries no risk (reshares are
desired). Sharing at higher sensitivity l > 0 with a contact c
who has reshare probability qc,l, is considered a risky decision
with associated risk
Rc,l = b log2(qc,l) + al (6)
where 2al is the damage value associated with a privacy breach
(a known reshare) at sensitivity level l, and b > 0 controls
how risk averse the user is (their risk posture). When the user
considers sharing a post of sensitivity l with c, the associated
risk, Rc,l, is compared to the user’s risk-threshold, R¯. The DSS
warns the user if Rc,l > R¯ by placing contact c into the risky
list for that post. We define 5 sensitivity levels l = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
For l > 0, al = l meaning a privacy breach at sensitivity l is
half as damaging as one at l′ = l + 1 (l = 0 means no risk).
Risk posture, b, is set so Rc,l values, as closely as possible,
reflect a user’s preferences over risky decisions. Risk appetite,
R¯, represents the user’s maximum acceptable risk. These
parameters are given initial values based on user input (Section
V-C), then adjusted at runtime by the user (Section V-D).
C. Initialising Decision Support Parameters
As indicated, initial values for social benefit threshold, B¯,
risk-posture, b, and risk-threshold, R¯, are elicited from users
via a short, non-technical questionnaire, where they consider
outcomes in three sharing scenarios2. However, as a user may
not feel able to respond to one or more questions, we provide
null response options for each scenario, and generate default
values based on previous responses.
2The questionnaire can be found at bit.ly/2x4Fqqs
The social-benefit threshold, B¯ aims to identify contacts
who (on average) exceed a user’s expected level of social
engagement. We quantify this as the expected number of likes,
Nl, and comments, Nc, in response to a typical post from the
user to 10 recipients, and use this to predict the expected social
reward per person as:
B¯ = 0.1 · (Nc + 0.5Nl) (7)
The risk-posture, b, controls how the probability of a privacy
breach affects the associated risk. Values of 0 < b < 1 model
risk-averseness, b = 1 models risk-neutrality and b > 1 models
risk-seeking behaviour.
We elicit, b, indirectly from the user in terms of what we
call the trade-probability, q˜ – the probability at which the user
would trade exposure to two simultaneous privacy breaches for
a guaranteed privacy breach, where all such privacy breaches
are considered equally damaging. Risk posture is then calcu-
lated as:
b =
−1
log2(q˜)
(8)
The risk-threshold, R¯ < 0 (in conjuction with b) controls
the regularity of warnings in the DSS. This value is again indi-
rectly elicited, this time via the sensitivity 1 trigger probability,
q¯1 – the lowest probability of reshare for which the user would
liked to be warned. The risk threshold is then calculated as:
R¯ = a1 + b log2(q¯1) = b log2(q¯1) (9)
Trigger probabilities at other sensitivity levels (l > 0) can
then be calculated as: q¯l = 2
R¯−al
b .
D. Adjusting Decision Support Parameters
To provide additional user control over decision support,
and to allow for poorly initialised values to be corrected for,
we provide a mechanism to adjust risk-posture, b, and risk-
threshold, R¯, based on repeated contemporaneous judgements
of the working system.
Adjusting R¯: The lowest relevant sensitivity level, l = 1,
has a maximum associated reshare risk of 0 (see Equation (6)).
Therefore R¯ must be strictly negative, R¯ < 0. Otherwise, the
user would never be warned at l = 1. We therefore propose
multiplicative step adjustments to R¯ with a fixed factor η > 1
to lower R¯, and η−1 to raise it. More precisely, if the user
indicates that they have too many warnings, then we increase
the threshold with: R¯ ← η−1 R¯, which increases q¯l for all
l ≥ 1. Conversely, if the user indicates they are getting too
few warnings then we reduce the threshold with: R¯← ηR¯.
Adjusting b: The risk-posture is also strictly positive, i.e.
b > 0, so we again propose multiplicative changes by a new
step factor, ζ > 1. In our system, an increased risk-posture
corresponds to a greater differentiation between sensitivity
levels and vice versa. Therefore, the user can increase differen-
tiation between sensitivity levels with an incremental increase
in risk-averseness, effected with: b ← ζb. Similarly, a user
can decrease this differentiation by decreasing risk-averseness,
effected with: b ← ζ−1b. However, to ensure the baseline
trigger probability q¯1 remains unchanged, we also adjust
the privacy threshold. So an increase in risk-averseness is
accompanied by a reduction to the risk-threshold of: R¯← ζR¯.
Similarly, decrease in risk-averseness is accompanied by an
increase to the risk-threshold of: R¯← ζ−1R¯.
With these tools the user can incrementally shape the DSS
system to suit their privacy preferences.
VI. RELATED WORK, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A considerable body of research has been devoted to address
the information sharing problem raised by the increasing num-
ber of privacy incidents and regrets happening in OSNs [8],
[26]–[34]. However, these approaches do not consider the
situation when users may have made poor sharing decisions in
the past. Whereas, Machine learning and statistical inference
approaches like [35]–[40] study information diffusion in OSNs
in order to predict the temporal dynamics of the diffusion
process. A very recent work [41] uses Inductive logic pro-
gramming to build a formal model that learns users’ dynamic
social identities at runtime in order to analyse group processes
and intergroup relations in OSNs.
This paper presents a learning to share approach that
enables software engineers/developers to readily add adaptive
decision support to social network applications, such that the
user has fine grained, informed control over their privacy
settings. This allows users to maximise their social benefit,
whilst controlling risk of privacy breaches to levels they find
personally acceptable. We show how our approach can be used
in the context of Facebook as the selected OSN platform.
However the approach is applicable to other OSNs such as
LinkedIn and Google+. This approach could also be readily ex-
tended to provide privacy control for a broader family of online
interactions, such as undesirable cross-posting behaviours in
social question answering services (e.g., StackOverflow) [42].
As for future work, we plan to conduct an online question-
naire in which users are asked to consider outcomes of their
online sharing, based on scenarios discussed in Section V-C.
This will help us to initialise the parameters of the DSS with
realistic values. This will be followed by a user study to
help us evaluate the feasibility of our approach from users’
perspective within the context of Facebook. For this purpose,
a Facebook plug-in has been implemented and we are at the
stage of designing and conducting the user study. Finally we
will organise a workshop with OSN developers and present
our learning to share architecture, implemented as Facebook
plugin and the user study results. During this workshop we
will collect qualitative feedback from developers and elicit
their tendency towards integrating our approach as a privacy
management for OSNs.
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